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In the Former Soviet Union, the early 1990s were characterized by large 
falls in GDP and small changes to already low unemployment. The slow 
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means to maintain employment levels, including; extended periods of 
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theoretical model presented here explains why it was rational for firms to 
adjust labour in this way. The nature of inherited features of the Soviet 
labour market and lack of institutions necessary for a competitive market 
economy meant it was in the firm's interest initially to maintain 
employment levels. Quantitative analysis using Kyrgyz data for 1993 and 
1996 provides evidence of changing economic behaviour in agents over 
this period. 
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1 Introduction
Despite similar programmes of reform being implemented in countries in Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) and those in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), recessions took
hold across these countries with varing degrees of severity and duration. The FSU
experienced almost twice the size of the falls in GDP as that in CEE. Unemployment
increased rapidly in CEE while in the FSU moderate increases were only experienced
in the late 1990s, see Table 5 in the Appendix. Oﬃcial unemployment statistics1
reported unemployment to be less than 1% of the labour force until the mid-90s,
increasing to 5% between 1995-1996. This diﬀers from the outcome in countries of
CEE which experienced positive growth rates in GDP, albeit small, even in the early
1990s but much larger changes in unemployment. In fact, in the countries of the
FSU the reform policies failed to create a competitive market-based environment
but rather led to what has been called a “transformation crisis”, with protracted
falls in output and high inflation (see Poser (1999)). Inflation was also much higher
in FSU Republics compared to CEE, the former experiencing triple digit inflation
while the latter was only around 10-20% in the early 1990s (see Table 6 in the
Appendix). The variation in outcomes from the impact of the reform process can
indeed be ascribed to the previous nature of the regimes in the respective countries
and the degree with which reform was embraced and implemented. Indeed some
countries had significant features of a market economy several years prior to reform
such as Hungary and Poland, while others had been relatively more isolated from
non-socialist countries and then introduced swift rapid restructuring programmes,
such as Republics in Central Asia, see (Barr 1994) and (E.B.R.D. 1995).
This paper does not try to explain the diﬀerences in outcome between CEE
and FSU, but instead aims to provide a rationale for the adjustment path that
occurred in the FSU. More precisely, the paper is concerned with explaining the
slow adjustment of the labour market to output falls in one of the smaller Republics
1Includes only those registered unemployed.
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of the FSU, the Kyrgyz Republic. The Kyrgyz Republic is a small land-locked
mountainous country of approximately 4.6m people. The Republic is one of the
poorest of the five Central Asian Republics with few natural resources. The aﬀects
of the breakup of the Soviet Union on the Kyrgyz Republic included the loss of an
integrated trading market and cross-country subsidies, particularly from Moscow
(transfers from Moscow accounted for as much as 10% of GDP till 1991, see The
World Bank (1993)), and the collapse of a highly specialized integrated production
system that spanned Republics within the Union (see Rumer (1989) and Rutkowski
(1996)). Despite this the Kyrgyz Republic embarked on what was claimed a rapid
programme of reform (E.B.R.D. (1995)). Although there are similarities between
the transition with Russia, little is known of the experience of the smaller agrarian
economies in the transition to a market economy.
The Kyrgyz Republic experienced falls in GDP of 20% with only positive rates
of growth emerging in late 1995, far later than expected. The unemployment figures
for the Kyrgyz Republic2 are below Russia’s, despite the well-known problem of
surplus labour in Central Asia, and doubled from 3% in late 1994 to 6% in 1996,
the first year of positive growth in GDP. This trend in unemployment is consistent
with other measures of unemployment based on the ILO definition using nationally
representative household survey data over a transitional period, though absolute
levels of real unemployment is much higher than oﬃcial statistics. Unemployment
rates were found to have increased from 15% in 1993 to 28% in 1996, see Table 1
on page 22. Participation rates fell by 18% over the period, greater than the 15%
decrease in employment rates. Although unemployment rates for men increased
more than for women, participation rates for women decreased by 23% over the
period, far greater than for men.
This paper provides a theoretical framework for the enterprise’s adjustment pro-
cess illustrating why slow changes in unemployment, despite large persistent falls in
2Oﬃcial statistics, which include only those registered unemployed.
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output, formed part of a rational outcome. It will be shown that given the institu-
tional features of the labour market which were part of the Soviet system it was in
the enterprise’s interest to maintain its work force in the early period of the transi-
tion process and adjust other factors, such as intensity of worker and current wage
costs. Firms were in receipt of subsidies for the provision of social benefits through
the enterprise and had access to additional finances allowing them to continue non-
profit maximizing behaviour. By varying worker intensity (reducing hours) and
delaying costs (wage arrears) employers were initially able to maintain their present
employment levels. As the transition to a market economy evolved, State subsidies
to the enterprises fell and firms eventually had to cut employment levels. A model
of the employer’s adjustment strategy explains why these occurrences form a ratio-
nal response to the changing environment. An empirical analysis is applied based
on a tobit model of hours of work in the primary workplace to indicate changing
behaviour in the work place.
The explanation of the adjustment process incorporates features of firms adjust-
ing worker intensity rather than quantity, similar to that in Brechling (1965). In
Brechling (1965), in the presence of hiring and training costs, firms are shown to
pay existing workers a higher, bonus, wage to work additional hours rather than hire
additional workers in the light of an increase in demand. Similarly here employers
react to a fall in demand by reducing worker hours and delaying wage payments.
Firms delay outlays to other firms and, in particular, wages as a means of delaying
costs. The ability to delay wage payments to workers can also be seen as the firms
ability to substitute away from cash balances as in Brechling and Lipsey (1963).
The authors show that trade credit3 can frustrate a tightening of monetary policy
in one instance if there is the opportunity to substitute away from cash balances
and the firm has the ability to issue transferable trade credit in the form of IOUs.
This can be seen as similar to the enterprise’s inability to pay workers their wages
3Defined as the sum of outstanding bills and accounts which arise out of transactions among
firms or between firms and households, see pg 620, Brechling and Lipsey (1963).
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in the event of a fall in demand of its output as well as the fall in transfers from
the State. Firms are able to delay workers wages, with a promise to pay later or are
able to pay in-kind in the form of the firm’s production.
The paper is structured as follows: a background to the Soviet labour market
is presented in section 2. Section 3 examines firm level behaviour and presents a
theoretical model of firms’ adjustment decisions. Section 4 describes the data used
in the empirical analysis presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Under the Soviet System
Centralized planning which was prevalent in the FSU resulted in a mismatch between
labour supply and demand across diﬀerent regions and this was exacerbated by
the lack of available housing and the need for a valid residential permit, called a
‘propiskia’. Workers were expected to have jobs for life in the enterprise, and work
their way up through the highly graded system. In reality labour was relatively
mobile and workers were free to change jobs and employers were free to hire whom
they wanted, with the majority of hires arranged directly between workers and
potential employers, see Marnie (1990), Standing (1991), Barr (1994) and Clarke
(1999). Clarke (1999) reports that by the mid-1960s overall rates of labour mobility,
approximated by turnover rates in the Soviet Union, were around 20% per annum
falling to approximately 15% by the mid-1980s.
In the FSU wage rates were set centrally and strictly regulated. Wage levels were
largely determined by a tariﬀ system of around 20 coeﬃcients, based on qualifications
and occupation. Workers worked their way up the tariﬀ system according to their
rank with the first grade for each profession being determined by an obligatory
minimum wage to maintain a certain standard of living, see Shcherbakov (1991)
and Oxenstierna (1990). However non-monetary fringe benefits were often used by
employers as a method of rewarding more valued workers, and these would include
better housing, the use of a dacha, licences to purchase rationed goods amongst
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other things; so the more highly educated or privileged elite would in fact be better
oﬀ despite relative equalities in money wage income.
Places of employment at enterprises were not only sources of wage income but
also institutions through which other facilities and benefits were provided to all
family members, working and non-working. These services included health and edu-
cation facilities, child care, subsidized canteens and often also housing. To a greater
extent than in Eastern and Central Europe, firms in the FSU provided a wider range
of services usually provided by municipalities or other branches of government in
market economies. According to McAuley (1997), the provision of such services and
benefits through price controls and subsidies, to ensure aﬀordability to the majority
of individuals, led to severe budgetary problems in the 1980s and contributed to
the collapse of communism. Recently implemented policy has been designed to cut
firm benefits, including decrees that have forced firms to divest themselves of their
social assets. Freed from an exogenous requirement to provide benefits, firms were
expected to limit provision of benefits that are costly or risky for the firm, resulting
in negative implications for employee welfare. In particular the de novo (newly cre-
ated private) firms and recently privatized enterprises would cut back their provision
of such benefits since they would be motivated more by profitability. However this
has not been the case with even enterprises facing financial diﬃculties still providing
such benefits, and even privatized enterprises providing benefits of some sort (Fa-
jth and Lakatos (1997) and Commander and Jackman (1997)). There has however
been a reduction in the array of facilities. In addition the current policy structure of
compensation from the State to firms, in terms of tax advantages and subsidies, is
positively related to the amount of resources the firm has and creates a disincentive
for enterprises to reducing the amount of labour they employ. Data on Russia show
that expenditure on social benefits and services by firms was found to amount to
about 4.1% of GDP in 1992 and 3.3% in 1993, or approximately 30% of total labour
costs, with firms estimated to have contributed at least one-quarter of total expen-
diture to housing, health, education and cultural services in 1993, see Commander,
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Liberman, and Yemstov (1993). The authors purport this to be equivalent to about
14% of the enterprises total wage bill in 1993 for all firms, while for industrial firms
the figure was found to be as high as 20% of the total wage bill. In contrast, they
find Polish expenditure on social housing funds as a percentage of the wage bill was
no more than 10% for industry in 1989. This meant that in general enterprises of
the FSU entered transition with a higher level of commitment to benefit provision.
3 Explaining the Behaviour of the Firm
Exploring the interaction between workers and employers within the context of the
inherited Soviet institutional features provides a greater understanding of the ad-
justment process that occurred.
In this paper it is argued that labour managed models of the firm, rather than
insider models of the firm (see Blanchard, Commander, and Coricelli (1995)) are
appropriate for analyzing firm behaviour. In the latter models, wages are set as
high as possible to maintain enough employment for the insiders. However, Blan-
chard, Commander, and Coricelli (1995) state there are three qualifying factors to
the insider model, which provide some explanation for the diﬀerences in outcomes
across the FSU and CEE countries. The first qualification refers to the relative role
of the workers versus managers, the second to the time horizons of both workers
and managers, which in turn depend on the process of privatization (the slower the
privatization process the longer the horizon and the opportunity for managers and
workers to work together through restructuring), and the third to the external en-
vironment in which the firm operated, in terms of hard or soft budget constraints.
These are taken in turn.
The greater role of workers in decision-making was found to be related to trade
union membership. Although membership of trade unions was widespread, the de-
gree of militancy varied and was found to be relatively low in CSFR and Hungary,
compared to Poland, see Blanchard, Commander, and Coricelli (1995). It was also
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expected that as a result of the privatization process changes in the ownership, and
ultimately the governance structure, would accelerate the elimination of any em-
ployment bias by varying the relative bargaining power of managers and workers,
see Commander, Fan, and Shaﬀer (1996). Changes in the governance structure
through outsider stakeholders were expected to have a greater impact in restruc-
turing within the enterprise. However this did not happen and the privatization
programme resulted in insiders holding a dominant ownership. In Russia, and in
the FSU in general, privatization resulted in insider control, with managers often
getting a disproportionate share of control, and claimed to reflect the explicit de
facto importance of workers in decision-making, see Blanchard, Commander, and
Coricelli (1995).
Even when managers were in decision-making positions worker influence was in
no way marginal, and managers rarely made decisions at odds with the perceived
interests of their workers. This is likely to be a combination of both adjustment
costs as well as expectations with respect to future output, constituting some form
of labour smoothing, as well as benevolence, which would explain the continuing
high hiring rates. The privatization of enterprises also meant that there was now
limited opportunity for managers to shift between positions previously appointed
directly by the State.
One reason workers were willing to cooperate with managers over working con-
ditions was for the provision of social benefits through enterprises, which can be
seen as a social safety net. State enterprises were often large employers, particularly
in the FSU and were also places where social benefits were provided though the
cost was often borne by the State through a transfer or subsidy. The amount of
transfers was dependent on the resources, namely labour, the enterprise utilized.
The economies of scale of large scale benefit provision meant that it was relatively
cheaper for a large scale firm to provide such benefits to a large number of workers.
Workers who maintain attachment to enterprises are thus able to gain access to
facilities, such as kindergartens, subsidized canteens, health care, where no alterna-
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tive (aﬀordable) provision is available outside the enterprise, see Standing (1993).
However, with the collapse in output and the loss of transfers from Moscow, state
enterprises did experience financial diﬃculties as enterprise subsidies gradually de-
creased, energy prices and the prices of inputs increased while the market for many
of these unsaleable goods disappeared. This lead to the worsening of the financial
position of many enterprises.
Welfare considerations are likely to help explain why workers remained attach-
ment to enterprises even when wages are paid with delay, and may also help explain
why wage arrears were endured by the work force. This is also reinforced given
that wage arrears were relatively widespread and workers were unlikely to be paid
in other places of employment, should firms be hiring. Shorter working hours were
also introduced. By allowing flexibility in hours, workers are able to divert eﬀort to
other activities, formal or informal, where they were likely to be paid. However this
paternalistic role of employers is likely to change over the coming years as respon-
sibility for non-monetary benefits diminishes. See Standing (1993) on the changing
role of the state.
The uncertainty regarding future expectations can be understood given the
unique situation of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The demise of the CMEA
Council and the liberalization of input prices resulted in sharp falls in demand for
products which are unlikely to be able to compete in other competitive markets. The
persistence in the down turn in demand and the need to find new markets for prod-
ucts caused uncertainty in production decisions. In response, managers maintained
a supply of labour in lieu of the increase in demand.
The uncertainty of the change in demand also led to employers being reluctant
to get rid of skilled labour which they would need if demand were to pick up.
The reluctance to adjust the quantity of labour is reinforced if employers encounter
costs of hiring and training new workers and thus the loss of workers would be a
loss of investment. These non-wage costs and specific worker skills result in labour
being costly to adjust in the short term, hence labour can be seen as a quasi-
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fixed factor in the short term, see Oi (1980). Rather than varying employment
levels, employers varied hours of input and accepted flexibility in workers’ eﬀort
levels. This is similar to the adjustment described in Brechling (1965) using the
example of British manufacturers, where for an unexpected change in demand it
is optimal for the firm to pay its existing workers a higher wage for additional
hours rather than hire additional workers which would involve hiring and training
costs. Adjustment is in terms of the hours of utilization of the work-force rather
than quantity of work force. In the Kyrgyz Republic, and in the FSU in general,
instead of actually laying oﬀ workers, those employed were subjected to reduced
hours, extended leave, particularly maternity leave for women (although positions
previously kept available for women on maternity leave were later withdrawn) and
wage arrears, while the enterprise went through bad times. These mechanisms had
the result of decreasing the firms’ wage bill, often costlessly in terms of unpaid
leave or wage arrears particularly in times of high inflation, while still maintaining a
supply of skilled labour should demand pick up. Even when paid, workers were often
paid in-kind in the output of the firm that the firm could not sell and workers would
find their own outlets to sell or barter the goods. The incidence of wage arrears has
been particularly severe, with little diﬀerence in whether the enterprise is state or
private, see Evans-Klock and Samorodov (1998) and Windell, Anker, and Sziraczki
(1995).
At the enterprise level, the legacy of the Soviet period created incentives which
led to distortions in economic behaviour, focusing on short-term gains. Informational
problems of the central planning agency and the distortions of price and lack of
private property are attributed with causing x-ineﬃciency or ‘organizational slack’
in the allocation of resources (Poser 1999). Output maximization seemed to be a
central issue, with senior managers awarded generous bonuses for meeting prescribed
targets (Chapter 5, Bergson (1964)). However targets were set not only for output
levels, but also for per unit costs. If output targets were met, there was some
flexibility over employment and wage bill targets and hence it was in the employer’s
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interest to consider both input and output targets, though it was not unusual for
firms to run budget deficits (see Portes (1969)). The transition period was expected
to be a period over which the firm’s objectives moved towards profit maximization
under competitive behaviour. Since a loss making firm was not expected to become
a profit making firm instantaneously, in the interim period the firm was often able
to gain some additional financing from State banks or other financial institutions
to cover some of these deficits. The firm was thus able to operate under what was
referred to as a soft budget constraint. The absence of formal bankruptcy laws
and the ability to gain additional finances and postpone outlays in the FSU, and
in particular in the Kyrgyz Republic, have enabled unprofitable firms to continue
production and is important in understanding the slow adjustment in the labour
market despite the falls in output demand.
The availability of additional financing permitted the continuation of old prac-
tices in State enterprises and this was perpetuated by the privatization process which
led to a majority of the enterprises being sold to their managers, or employees, and
enterprises became largely insider dominated. The result in many countries, as in
the Kyrgyz Republic, was merely a change in ownership without the supporting in-
stitutions, financial, legal framework, bankruptcy laws, defined property rights etc.
to make change in ownership eﬀective, see Thornton (1997).
Another reason for inducing more cooperative work relations is due to the asym-
metrical information about the nature of the work and the eﬀort and skill required,
which only employees truly know, see Williamson (1975) and Birdsall (2000). The
eﬀects of morale on productivity, particularly in large organizations, where workers
feel they are merely raw inputs in the production process rather than part of the
organization, has been documented as far back as Florence (1953) and more recently
in King (1990).
Taking together all these qualifications to the insider model, it is argued that
a labour managed or bargaining models are more appropriate than insider models
for understanding firm behaviour in the initial years of the reform process. In fact
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outcomes of insider models can also be explained by managers’ decisions rather like
a bargaining model. Rather than workers and managers colluding in the interests
of the incumbent, managers decide to adjust their labour flows similar to insider
models but where managers have a bigger role.
The ability to do this resulted in delayed restructuring of the firm and slowed
the move to competitive profit maximizing behaviour. These approaches provide
an understanding of the gains of cooperation between workers and employers which
have existed over the years.
The result of the persistence in labour hoarding from not adjusting employment
levels is declining average productivity in the short run. This is well known even
in market economies (Brechling 1965). This phenomenon is embodied in Okun’s
work, (Okun 1981), which states that output fluctuates more than employment in
the course of the trade cycle and the average productivity of labour is pro-cyclical.
Again according to Okun’s work the average productivity of labour rises with em-
ployment and output, and falls when they decline. This is consistent with previous
Soviet ideology that the way to maximize output is to include all surplus labour.
The consequences of the divergence between actual average productivity increases
with employment and the usual assumptions about diminishing returns to employ-
ment explain the diﬀerences in outcome of employment from falls in output. This
relationship can be seen in Figure 1 below, which illustrates the consequence of an
output fall, such as that in the Kyrgyz Republic and similar transitional economies.
3.1 A Graphical Illustration
In Figure 1 the production function labelled ‘apparent’ production function has the
property that the average productivity of labour increases with employment and
output, while the ‘true’ production function embodies the usual assumptions of the
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law of diminishing returns4.
An output fall from X1 to X2 should result in a fall of employment from N1 to N2
at point B, the long-run cost minimizing level. Instead employment falls only to N3
at C, along the apparent production function. The costs associated with production
are embodied in the cost function, Cf , in the bottom half of the figure. Instead of
the costs falling from C1(X1,N1) to C2(X2, N2), the cost of production along the
true production function with output OX2 at point B, the cost of production falls
only to C2(X2, N3) at point E, corresponding to point C on the actual production
function. However, in addition, costs in the short run are further reduced when
firms reduce their outlay by delaying payments to other firms and or to workers in
the form of wage arrears. This reduces firms costs to the cost function C´f . So in
fact in the short run firm experiences lower costs, C
0
2(X2, N3), point F.
The disparity between these two production functions, the actual and the true,
explains why in the short run employment did not appear to adjust fully to output
falls. The lowering of costs by delaying payments explains why these small shifts in
employment persisted.
3.2 The model
Here we formalize the adjustment process, illustrated in Figure 1, based on stylized
facts of soviet institutional features in a model of employers production decisions.
It is necessary to understand the environment in which firms operate to appreciate
the adjustment path that firms took. Firms operating under the soviet ideology
diﬀer from firms operating under competitive markets for several reasons. Firstly,
enterprises provide social benefits to the worker through the enterprise. The costs
of these benefits are covered by a transfer from the State which is dependent on the
4Although it should be noted that at some point the apparant production function will even-
tually exhibit diminishing returns to scale.
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amount of labour resources the firm utilizes. Secondly, firms have neither equity
nor debt and thirdly, the compulsion to make profit is weak. The objective under
central planning was not profit maximization and hence it was not unusual for the
firm to operate at a financial loss. In the transitional period to a market economy
the firm is able to renegotiate additional finances to cover the deficits from State
Banks and institutions, though there is a limit to the amount of finances the firm
can continuously renegotiate. This is income over and above the revenue received
from selling the output and allows the firm to operate within a soft budget con-
straint. The enterprise knows that it can only renegotiate a limited, but positive,
amount of finances during the transition period. Thus it is assumed that rather
than maximizing profits, which is the conventional approach for firms operating un-
der competitive markets, enterprises aim to minimize the deficit. The deficit is the
diﬀerence between the revenue employers gain from both the output produced and
the subsidy from the State, and the costs of production and costs of provision of
social benefits. This diﬀers from the firm’s objective of profit maximization and cost
minimization since there is the added dimension of subsidies and costs to the firm
which are dependent on the quantity of labour, which alters the firm’s objectives.
This is also consistent with the objective of maximizing output whilst minimizing
unit costs, as described in Bergson (1964) and Desai and Estrin (1992). Despite
these diﬀerences, the firm’s behaviour can be analyzed using the standard tools as
long as we adapt it for the particular institutional circumstances. Here it is neces-
sary to distinguish between the subsidies received for providing employee benefits
and also the costs to the firm of doing so in the production function. The inputs
used in production are defined as the amount of labour, capital, and all other inputs,
as well as the hours worked as an indicator of the intensity in which labour is used.
This allows employers to adjust hours of work as well as the amount of labour (and
capital and all other inputs), see (Brechling 1965). For this reason hours of labour
input enters the firms production function.




D ≡ {C1 + C2}− {R + S}
subject to the revenue and cost function constraints,
C1 = whNi + ru(ki) + pII (1)
C2 = NiC2(Ni) (2)
R = zi(hNi, u(ki), I)p (3)
S = NiΦ(Ni) (4)
C1 is the cost of production and C2 is the cost of providing the social benefit to
workers. R is revenue from the production of output, represented by the production
function zi(hNi, u(ki), I) times the price of p. For employer i, the production func-
tion includes Ni workers, hired h hours, physical capital k and all other inputs I. S
is the subsidy from the State to the enterprise for the provision of social benefits.
S and C2 are the new elements relative to the standard model. Here subsidies and
costs are specified as so much per worker Φ(Ni) and C2(Ni) respectively, but alter-
native formulations can be provided e.g. Φ(Ni) as a lump sum, independent of the
number of workers. It is assumed there are economies of scale of benefit provision.
The first order condition for minimizing the deficit D is;
dD ≡ dC1 + dC2 − dR− dS = 0 (5)
and the first order derivatives for each component are given as;
dC1 = whdNi + wNidh+ hNidw + ru
0
k(k)dk + u(k)dr + pIdI + IdpI




dz = zhNidh+zNhdNi +zku0k(k)dk +zIdI
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dS = Φ(Ni)dNi +NiΦ0(Ni)dNi
The whole expression can be written as;
dD = {whdNi + wNidh+ hNidw + ru0k(k)dk + u(k)dr + pIdI + IdpI}
+{C2(Ni) +NiC 02(Ni)} dNi
−{pzhNidh+ pzNhdNi + pzku0k(k)dk + pzIdI +zdp}
− {Φ(Ni) +NiΦ0(Ni)} dNi (6)
A more intuitive way of writing Equation 6 is;
dD = {wNidh+ hNidw}+ {(r − pzk)u0k(k)dk} + u(k)dr}
(wage bill) (capital costs)
+{(pI − pzI)dI + IdpI −zdp− pzhNdh} + {wh− pzNh}dNi
(Non-labour costs − Revenue) + (wage − marginal product of labour )(7
+ {C2(Ni) +NiC 02(Ni)− Φ(Ni)−NiΦ0(Ni)}}dNi
(net cost of benefit provision)
where dz > 0, p > pI and zh < 0, zk < 0, zN < 0 consistent with diminishing
returns.
Alternatively Equation 6 can be expressed as,
dD = A+B = 0 (8)
where A is the standard (neoclassical) term for a change in profit or loss and B
is the institutionally specific terms due to subsidies, or costs of reducing workers.
In equilibrium we assume that the rate of interest, capital accumulation and all
other inputs are fixed i.e. r, k and I hence dr = 0, dk = 0 and dI = 0. Enterprises
cannot influence p and pI directly hence also dp = 0 and dpI = 0.
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So in equilibrium A and B can be defined as,
A = whdNi + wNidh+ hNidw − pzhNidh− pzNhdNi (9)
B = {C2(Ni) +NiC 02(Ni)− Φ(Ni)−NiΦ0(Ni)}dNi (10)
In a neoclassical firm in equilibrium it would be expected that A = 0 (i.e. no
change in profits or loss), but here since in equilibrium the change in the deficit
must equal zero, dD = 0, it is possibly that in fact A > 0, and B < 0, i.e. firms
can experience a loss while in receipt of subsidies.
Thus re-arranging Equation 9, A can be rewritten as;
A = (w − pzh)Nidh+ (w − pzN)hdNi + hNidw > 0 (11)
= ( αdh ) + ( βdNi ) + ( γdw )
while B remains the same.
Before transition each of the two terms α and β above could be taken as positive,
or at best zero, since workers are paid a premium above productivity. This is
illustrated in Figure 2. Prior to reform, workers are employed for h1 hours and are
paid a wage, w, which is higher then their marginal product, at point f. As the
enterprise reduces the hours of work from h1 to h2 the wage equals the marginal
product at point e and with h2 hours. In this case it is in the firm’s interest to
reduce worker hours. Then the firm may travel along the curve to reduce hours to
h3 and this will raise marginal product to g.
If hours are cut (i.e. dh > 0, dNi = 0, dw = 0) then the marginal product
of hours of labour, zh, would increase (zhh < 0). Thus (w − pzh)Nidh would be
decreasing i.e. getting less positive if hours are cut.
Alternatively, rather than changing hours, employers could change employment
(i.e. dNi > 0, dh = 0, dw = 0). If employment is adjusted the eﬀect would be
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βdNi + B (12)
or
{(w − pzN)h+ C2(Ni) +NiC 02(Ni)− Φ(Ni)−NiΦ0(Ni)}dNi (13)
From Equation 13 the aﬀect of adjusting the numbers employed will depend
largely on the net cost of benefit provision, since this term is dependent on the
number of workers. If this term is negative, i.e. C2(N) < Φ(N), then adding an
additional worker will decrease the firm’s deficit by increasing the revenue of the
firm and firms will hire more workers (since the subsidy the employer receives for
hiring an additional worker is higher than the cost of providing social benefits). If
the net cost of provision of social benefits is positive, i.e. C2(N) > Φ(N), then
employers will increase revenue if they decrease employment. The first case, with
costs per worker of benefit provision less than the per worker State transfer, is likely
to be the situation at the start of the reform process. This is not unreasonable since
there are likely to be economies of scale in providing benefits through the enterprise
and hence for large scale employers, the transfer for an additional worker is assumed
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to cover the additional cost of benefit provision. Hence not only is the amount of
transfer from the State important, but also the level of employment at the enterprise
since the size of the enterprise’s work force aﬀects which benefits the firm can aﬀord
to provide.
So firms can alter hours or quantity of workers, dh or dNi. However, if employers
encounter large hiring costs when they employ an additional worker, employers could
incur huge losses by firing workers. So in the short run at least, the quantity of
employees will be fixed. Employers will than vary the intensity of the use of labour
if they cannot change the number of workers. In the long run however both factors,
the intensity and quantity of workers, will be variable. If there were no hiring costs
associated with employing workers than both hours of work and number of workers
employed would be variable in the short run and the eﬀects to revenue would be the
same as described in the long run above and will depend upon diﬀerences in Φ(N)
and C2(N) .
In both cases it has been assumed that wages were not adjusted, dw = 0. From
Equations 11 and 13 it can be seen that cutting wages, dw > 0, would have a
negative impact on A and would reduce overall losses in the short term (dw only
appears in Equation 11). Hence by delaying wages and cutting hours firms would
re-enforce the eﬀect on losses.
As enterprises move towards more competitive behaviour, firms will no longer
be responsible for providing benefits and hence subsidies to the firm will also cease
i.e. the terms S() and C2() drop out from employer’s objective function. So rather
than minimizing the deficit, the firm’s objective will be to maximize profits. Firms
will have to reduce costs of productions and this will initially be a reduction in the
provision of benefits (reducing C2(N)).
We now turn to an empirical analysis of household data to test if implications
of the model can indeed be supported by the data. Here we examine for evidence
of changing behaviour in the workplace by examining the determinants of hours of
work as an indication of work intensity. Before presenting the results, the following
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section provides a description of the data.
4 Data description
The empirical analysis is based on nationally representative data from the Kyrgyz
Multipurpose Poverty Survey (KMPS) for the Fall of 1993 and 1996. These surveys
are World Bank sponsored household surveys, based on the World Bank’s well-
established Living Standard Measurement Survey. The 1993 survey was designed
for the purpose of identifying the poor, while the 1996 Survey was more in line with
the standard LSMS format.
A stratified multi-stage sampling procedure was followed so that, in principle,
every household had a non-zero random chance of falling into the sample. This paper
draws largely from the Adult Questionnaire, and in particular the section related
to time use or employment for those respondents aged 16 years and older. In both
years roughly 2,000 households and 10,000 individuals were interviewed. Definitions
pertaining to the labour market used in the analysis have been taken from ILO
guidelines as far as the survey allows, see Blyton (1989) and Hughes (1989).
In 1993 the private sector was still relatively small and so from the 1993 data the
number of observations classified as “worker and not entrepreneur nor independent
worker”, referred to as “worker”, was 2,796 out of a total of 2,949 observations for
the employed, or 94.8% of those employed. In the 1996 data, of the total number of
observations of the employed, 2,167 observations, 1,682 were classified as “worker”,
or 77.6%. These numbers represent the initial sample sizes before any data cleaning
was undertaken for the analysis.
A problem encountered with the 1993 data was the large number of responses
of those who classified themselves as working for an enterprise but did not report
hours of work and reported not to be on involuntary or administrative leave. Out
of the 922 individuals of working age who claimed to be working, 245 were women
on maternity leave while 677 remain unaccounted for. The corresponding figures for
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those individuals classified as workers and not entrepreneurs, independent workers
or self-employed, are 822 not reporting hours, of which again 245 are women on
maternity leave. The rest belong to a variety of other occupations. The majority
belong to less skilled occupations, over 60% are from State enterprises, around 50%
are men and just over three-quarters are owed wage payments. Those individuals
who have reported being at work, i.e. not on maternity leave, or on holiday or
oﬃcial administrative leave, have been assigned a value of 0 hours worked. This
problem did not occur in the 1996 data and hence corresponding adjustments were
very minor for the 1996 data set.
5 Empirical Analysis
In this section empirical evidence is provided indicating that employers initially
adjusted worker intensity early in the reform process, in 1993, before significant
adjustments in the quantity of labour were made later on, in 1996. The reduction
in employee’s work-load is seen as a tool by which managers are able to reduce
labour costs whilst maintaining employment levels at the enterprise. In the absence
of employer or enterprise data, the empirical approach applied here is to look for
changes in hours worked in the primary place of employment.
For this study, those working less than 41 hours a week are considered to be
working less than full-time, or working reduced hours. An examination of the 1993
data found the majority of workers clustered around a 41 hour week while for the
1996 Survey workers were asked about their working schedules corresponding to a
41 hour week. This is diﬀerent from a widely used classification of part-time work
which is usually based on 15 hours or less a week since during the Soviet period
part-time work was, and is, relatively scare, see Oxenstierna (1990) and hence it
is important to examine how widespread the occurrence was of workers working
less than full-time. Oﬃcial part-time workers made up as little as 4% of the work
force in 1996, which translates to 12% of those on reduced hours. Though there
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are no comparative figures for 1993, evidence suggests it is unlikely to have been
higher than the 1996 rate, a relatively low figure given the high fertility rate and
employment rate for women. Oxenstierna (1990) also notes that part-time work was
even rare amongst women. Although however oﬃcially working full-time, women
who had to manage responsibilities both at home and at work did in fact have low
productivity at work. Also, despite the oﬃcial retirement age of 55 years for women,
and 60 years for men, people are able to work and claim their pension, which they
often do given the low level of pension payments. For this reason data disaggregated
by age for older workers have diﬀering cut-oﬀ values for men and women.
Here we look at those workers working less than full-time hours including those
placed on oﬃcial reduced schedules. We do not diﬀerentiate between workers vol-
untarily working less than 41 hours from those on oﬃcial reduced schedules in the
summary statistics but do account for this diﬀerence in the regression analysis.
Firstly we examine the over picture of the labour market and the incidence of
workers working less than full-time.
5.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 illustrates how the overall labour market changed between 1993 and 1996. It
can be seen that over this period there was a contraction in the labour force, shown
in a fall in the participation rate from 66% to 54% of the working age population.
In particular the percentage of women that have withdrawn from the labour market
by 1996 is as high as 23%. The rural areas have fared particularly badly, with
unemployment more than doubling.
Table 2 illustrates the incidence of less than full-time working schedules for spec-
ified characteristics. In 1993 the incidence of workers working less than a full-time
schedule was as high as 25%. However, including the number of workers who were
working and did not report any hours which was 21%, the figure increases to 46%
of workers. The incidence fell to 32% by 1996. The low standard errors suggest this
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Table 1: Labour force rates, 16+ and working-age, 1993 and 1996
16+ Total Male Female Urban Rural
(s.e. in parentheses)
Participation 1993 0.66 0.76 0.56 0.63 0.67
Rates (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
1996 0.54 0.66 0.43 0.53 0.55
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Employment 1993 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.86
Rate (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1996 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.84 0.66
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Unemployment 1993 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14
Rate (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1996 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.16 0.34
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
16-54/59
Participation 1993 0.78 0.85 0.72 0.77 0.79
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Rates 1996 0.65 0.74 0.55 0.63 0.66
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Employment 1993 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.83 0.86
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Rate 1996 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.84 0.65
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Unemployment 1993 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.14
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Rate 1996 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.16 0.35
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1993 and 1996
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Table 2: Working less than full-time per week, 1993 and 1996
1993 1996
Maternity Leave2 8.8
Reported hours missing2,3 20.8
Reported +ve hrs less than f/t 25.2
(0.011)
Total *including missing 46.0 32.0
(0.011) (0.012)















Wage arrears 36.9 51.8
(0.015) (0.026)
No wage arrears 46.1 26.4
(0.016) (0.012)
Occpuation Sector
Military 0.4 Agriculture 55.0
(0.171) (0.021)
Legislators 30.8 Mining 26.7
(0.074) (0.114)
Professionals 65.0 Manufacturing 17.7
(0.030) (0.028)
Technicians 56.5 Elec. gas, water 7.3
(0.033) (0.041)
Clerks 48.8 Construction 16.4
(0.046) (0.050)
Service Workers 28.0 Commerce 15.4
(0.043) (0.041)
Skilled Agri & Fishery wrks. 14.1 Transport 11.8
(0.066) (0.032)
Craft & related trade 50.2 Financial 3.1
(0.030) (0.031)





State 45.4 State 19.8
(0.013) (0.014)
Public Organization 35.1 Social Organization 38.1
(0.079) (0.106)
Work Collective 26.5 Cooperatives 30.8
(0.022) (0.037)



























1 Less than full-time is taken as less than 41 hrs/week.2 Out of all workers.
3 Includes those on maternity leave. 4Standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: Authors calculations based on KMPS 1993, 1996
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fall is statistically significant. Female workers had a higher incidence of working less
than full-time compared to men in 1993, while in 1996 the disparity reduced with
the incidence falling to just over 30% for both men and women. While there is no
particular age bias, in 1993 younger workers experienced a slightly lower incidence
of less than full-time schedule and in 1996 older workers (50-54/59 years old) had
a distinctly lower incidence at 19% compared to the other age groups which ranged
between 30% and 46%.
The diﬀerence across workers experiencing delays in wage payments and those
that do not is supportive of the hypothesis that workers adjusted intensity of hours.
In 1993 the incidence of less than full-time work was high across both categories
of workers while by 1996, those workers experiencing wage arrears had a higher
incidence of working less than full-time compared to those workers receiving wages.
This would suggest that employers adjusted worker intensity early in the transition
process and by 1996, those employers likely to be experiencing bad times, would
use both delays in payment and reduction in hours. The incidence was as high as
52% for workers experiencing wage arrears and 26% for those not experiencing wage
arrears, see Namazie (2001), for the incidence of wage arrears which was as high as
58% in 1993 but had fallen to 24% in 1996.
There are some distinctions across occupations with higher skilled occupations,
professionals and technicians, and the very lower skilled occupations, clerks and
craft and related trade workers, experiencing significantly higher reduced working
schedules than the other occupations. The incidence amongst these groups was
as high as 50% and above. Interestingly workers in elementary occupations and
skilled agricultural and fishery workers experienced the lowest incidence of less than
full-time work, apart from those in the military. The category elementary workers
includes largely farm workers, and these workers could well have continued to work
on the land for their own purposes (though it is important to note that agricultural
workers were subject to particularly high incidences of wage arrears, again refer to
Namazie (2001)). In 1996 the agricultural and service sectors both had higher in-
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cidences of less than full-time working schedules, 59% and 22% respectively, both
sectors which are dominated by low skilled workers. The majority of enterprises had
not been privatized in 1993 and hence State enterprises have a higher percentage of
workers on reduced schedule, 84%, than other categories. Work collectives had as
many as 10% on less than full-time working schedule. Work collectives were largely
agricultural based enterprises and included the Kolkhozs and Sovkhozs (collective
and state farms), with approximately 80% of workers from rural areas. Work collec-
tives also includes workers of cooperatives, and the latter tended to operate in areas
of catering and consumer goods and tended to be productively more eﬃcient than
many other forms of non-state ownership, and their workers often received higher
than average wages, see Kuznetsova (1991).
In 1993 there was a higher incidence of less than full-time work in the less rural
areas, though in general the frequency was 40% and over. In 1996 the incidence was
much lower across all regions, though rural regions had a higher incidence of less
than full-time work, particularly in the south which experienced higher incidences
of 44% and 50% in Djala-abad and Osh, compared to 20% or less in the rest of the
country.
These trends are consistent with the dire situation in 1993 which was particu-
larly bad for agricultural workers who may have worked longer hours in agricultural
activities as part of a subsistence-level coping strategy. In 1996, employers have ad-
justed quantity of employment to some extent, but still employers try to reduce work
intensity and costs. Agricultural workers, who still tend to be the worse oﬀ in 1996,
may have had to reduce hours in primary employment and substitute employment
with oﬀ-farm activities and this would account for the reduction in hours.
The above results showed evidence that reduction in work intensity was higher
in 1993 compared to later in 1996 when participation rates had fallen and unem-
ployment increased. However summary statistics provide a picture of incidence of a
reduced working schedule across diﬀerent worker characteristics. In order to capture
the interaction between diﬀerent eﬀects regression analysis is used.
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5.2 Regression Analysis
For this analysis the tobit model or censored regression, is used since the distribution
of the dependent variable (hours of work) being analyzed is a mixture of discrete
and continuous outcomes i.e. workers with zero and positive hours of work. A brief
definition of the variables included in the regressions can be found in the Appendix.












where y∗i is the natural log of weekly hours worked of workers in the primary place of
employment. The vector xi is a vector of both individual characteristics of workers,
including worker type and enterprise characteristics.
As mentioned previously in the data section, there are slight diﬀerences be-
tween the 1993 and 1996 surveys. For this reason there are slight diﬀerences in the
work-related variables included in the 1993 and 1996 regressions. For 1993 only
information on the wage that workers received is included. In 1996 information on
workers’ salary as well as amount received was provided and so both variables are
included. In both years a dummy variable for those who work in additional activities
is included, as well as the average income from these activities for those workers.
Workers who have been placed on a reduced working schedule by their employer
are identified by a dummy variable called “Reduced hours”. In 1993 information
on occupation codes was collected, while in 1996 there is information on worker
type and sector, as well as information on individuals’ years in the firm and in the
occupation.
The determinants of hours worked in the primary place of employment is likely
to diﬀer for men and women and hence number of children, both of the young (6-15)
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and very young (0-5) are included. Location dummies account for diﬀerences in the
economic conditions across regions. The oblast level rather than a lower geographical
level is included since workers are unlikely to be limited to working within a narrow
regional area. An array of household assets/durables is also included to provide
some control for the economic status of the household. In both years the list of
assets comprised of the following list; refrigerator, washing machine, black and white
television, colour television, video cassette recorder and a car. For 1993 ownership
of a motorbike is included in the regression but this information is not available in
1996. These items were selected to reflect those that were not necessarily biased by
location, since all areas have access to electricity and hence there is no urban bias
in the selection.
Ideally information on workers’ salary, not just amount received, would have been
useful. However this information was not collected in 1993, though given that wages
were still following the highly centralized rewarding system, distinctions between
workers in 1993 are likely to be captured in other work related variables. Despite
the slight diﬀerences in the survey, comparable information has been incorporated
and any loss of generality in the results is likely to be small.
5.3 Results
Due to the problems of accurate reporting of information on income and secondary
employment we note which characteristics are significant rather than attaching im-
portance to the value of the associated coeﬃcient.
Table 3 presents the results of the tobit regression for workers in 1993. From
these results it can be seen that wage arrears and an imposed reduced working sched-
ule have a negative eﬀect on hours worked, as does the amount of income workers
earn from additional activities. The latter indicates workers may be working out-
side their enterprise and hence are cutting down hours of work in their primary
employment. Plant operatives work less hours than elementary workers, and in-
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terestingly only “other” defined enterprise workers work less than State enterprise
workers, with workers in work collectives working longer (consistent with the finding
of agricultural workers working longer on land for their own gain as found in the
summary statistics). This is also consistent with urban workers working less hours
than workers in rural areas. As expected, men work longer hours than women and
having very young children has a negative impact on hours work.
Focusing on the separate male and female results, these results carry over with
only a few notable exceptions. There are no significant diﬀerences across occupation
groups for men, though female plant operators work less than female elementary
workers and again urban and rural diﬀerences carry over for women workers. Income
from secondary activities is only (negatively) significant for men.
Although not presented in the table, the array of durables, which is can be
interpreted as a proxy for wealth, were found to be jointly significant but only the
ownership of a refrigerator was (positively) significant across all three regressions.
In the 1996 results, in Table 4, again wage arrears, reduced working schedules
and income from secondary activities have a negative impact on hours worked.
The amount of wages the worker actually receives is negatively correlated with
hours worked and this is consistent with workers on higher salaries working longer
hours. Plant and machine operators is an indication of the relative size of blue collar
workers in the manufacturing sector. (This group comprises of approximately 16%
of workers in 1993, though many may also be found in the category for elementary
workers). Owners and members of manufacturing cooperatives work longer hours
compared to white collar workers, and workers in manufacturing work more hours
than agricultural workers, again consistent with higher paid workers working longer
hours.
The insignificance of educational diﬀerences in the overall model could be because
worker type and sectorial diﬀerences capture all diﬀerences in qualifications. There
is little indication that highly skilled workers left for privatized enterprises by 1996,
with State and Public/Social Organizations still retaining a higher proportion of
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individuals with higher education in their work force. This is not entirely unexpected
given enterprises were largely sectorial based. Workers with specific skills would have
not been choosing between State or non-State enterprises, but between sectors which
could lie wholly in one or the other form of ownership. This has been a result of
the sector-wide approach to privatization, with also certain industries (e.g. defence)
being wholly excluded from the privatization process.
Despite the number of years a worker has worked in his or her present occupation
or for his or her present firm which could be controlled for in the 1996 regression
runs, neither of these variables were significant. Though in the male-only sample,
workers with less than high school education work more hours than those with higher
education (this was found in the summary statistics).
The distinctions across males and females are less notable, except that the result
for higher salaries and inverse amount of wages received is significant for women
not men, while again income from additional activities is only negatively significant
for men. Also interestingly, having older children in the household has a negative
impact on male workers rather than female workers. The lack of eﬀect of children
in the household on female workers may be due to changes in the provision of
child care facilities (one facility that has been greatly reduced in many enterprises)
which has meant that pregnant women or women who do have to look after young
children have had to withdraw from the labour market altogether. Ownership of the
household durables items were not found to be significant in the three regressions.
Asset ownership may have been a more distinguishing feature amongst households in
1993, when households actually ran down their assets during the peak of the recession
while by 1996 asset ownership across households was not significantly diﬀerent.
Another interesting result is that less skilled workers in agricultural areas seem to
work less hours in their primary employment. In 1993 the economic conditions were
far worse and hence all workers (high skilled and less skilled) were aﬀected by the
situation, though again less skilled workers in agricultural activities did fare worse
even then. The improvements of the fit of the model (the log likelihood estimate
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falling from -4964.69 to -1892.50) provide some support for this too, implying that
work related variables appear to better explain workers’ patterns, more so than
in 1993. The reduction in the number of censored observations which reflects the
number of workers employed but not working at the enterprise over the period is also
an indication of change in employers’ behaviour. This is consistent with a reduction
in labour hoarding, and a general fall in (rural) employment rates.
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Table 3: Tobit regression of hours worked, 1993
ln hrs worked a week All Male Female
Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. t
constant 1.14 2.12 * 2.34 3.67 * 2.39 2.70 *
Age 0.04 1.53 0.01 0.32 -0.02 0.37
Age2 -0.05 1.38 -0.02 0.38 0.04 0.62
Gender (Female)
Male 1.12 9.98 *
Education level (Higher education)
Less than High School 0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.29 0.00 0.00
High School -0.46 3.30 * -0.36 2.14 * -0.56 2.41 *
Occupation Group (Elementary Workers)
Managers 0.26 0.67 -0.09 0.24 0.43 0.40
Professionals -0.05 0.27 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.20
Technicians -0.26 1.43 0.19 0.66 -0.45 1.74
Clerical 0.27 1.20 0.59 1.56 0.04 0.11
Personal Services -0.17 0.75 0.08 0.26 -0.54 1.45
Agri. Labour -0.49 1.28 0.05 0.13 -1.93 1.61
Craft -0.20 1.10 0.09 0.48 -0.57 1.25
Operatives -0.38 2.38 * 0.01 0.08 -1.46 3.75 *
Work Characteristics (Full-time)
Arrears -0.87 6.55 * -0.04 2.62 * -1.24 5.60 *
Reduced Hours -2.16 6.58 * -2.29 6.75 * -1.69 2.40 *
Ln mthly wages received 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.89
Hold second job 0.56 1.60 0.66 1.65 0.12 0.20
Ln Income other labour activ. -0.001 2.26 * -0.001 2.41 * -0.001 1.12
Enterprise (State)
Public Organization 0.51 1.37 0.58 1.20 0.24 0.42
Work collective 0.32 2.45 * -0.03 0.24 0.89 3.93 *
Private Firms 0.24 0.77 0.19 0.57 0.84 1.47
Other -0.74 1.91 * -1.45 3.40 * 0.29 0.40
Household attributes
No. of child. 0-5 years old -0.24 4.84 * 0.04 0.68 -0.66 7.47 *
No. of child. 6-16 years old 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.92 0.09 1.43
Assets
Type of Region (Rural)
Urban -0.30 2.14 * -0.17 1.00 -0.50 2.24 *
Oblasts (Osh)
Ethnicity (Kyrgyz)
Observations 2684 1419 1265
Log likelihood -4964.69 -2676.234 -2187.133
Psuedo R2 0.0422 0.0349 0.0622
LR Chi (d.f) 437.14 (42) 193.84 (41) 290.03 (41)
no. of censored obs. 861 348 513
Omitted groups for dummy variables are in (italics)
* statistically significant at the 5% level
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1993
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Table 4: Tobit regression of hours worked, 1996
Ln hrs worked a week Total Male Female
Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. t Coeﬀ. t
constant 3.17 10.75 * 3.68 10.22 * 2.66 5.19 *
Age -0.00 0.84 -0.00 0.24 0.01 0.27
age2 0.01 0.43 0.03 0.16 -0.03 0.10
Gender (Female)
Male 0.20 4.40 *
Education level (Higher education)
Less than High School 0.15 1.72 0.23 2.19 * 0.07 0.48
High School -0.03 0.47 -0.05 0.75 0.01 0.11
Worker type (White collar)
Blue collar -0.09 1.43 -0.14 1.82 -0.03 0.32
Owner 0.73 3.44 * 0.57 2.06 * 0.99 2.97*
Manu. Coop. 0.43 3.28 * 0.26 1.66 0.71 2.98*
Professional 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.67 0.02 0.06
Domestic services -1.27 1.50 -1.76 2.26 *
Skills/Experience (Years in firm & Occupation)
Work Characteristics
Arrears -0.76 3.63 * -0.22 2.21 * -1.04 2.97 *
Reduced hours -0.73 7.10 * -0.07 3.99 * -0.82 4.89 *
ln mthly Salary 0.12 3.94 * 0.00 1.01 0.21 3.40 *
ln mthly wages received -0.09 2.48 * -0.00 0.56 -0.12 2.03 *
Hold second job 0.33 1.30 0.10 0.34 0.06 0.90
ln Income other activities -0.10 1.99 * -0.002 3.42 * -0.00 0.97
Enterprise (State)
Social Organization -0.24 1.32 -0.16 0.52 -0.18 0.72
Cooperative -0.08 0.88 0.01 0.08 -0.23 1.37
Joint Company -0.08 1.06 -0.10 1.11 -0.02 0.11
Private firms 0.12 1.18 0.13 1.01 0.11 0.67
Farming community -0.11 0.93 -0.07 0.59 -0.26 0.92
Private farm -0.40 4.30 * -0.39 3.76* -0.44 2.35*
Other
Sector (Agriculture)
Mining -0.31 1.33 -0.17 0.76
Manufacturing 0.23 2.25 * 0.27 2.36* 0.20 0.94
Utility 0.10 0.65 -0.01 0.04 0.35 1.09
Construction 0.14 1.05 0.19 1.42 -0.03 0.08
Commerce 0.06 0.49 0.10 0.62 -0.02 0.11
Transport 0.01 0.12 0.13 1.06 -0.20 0.75
Finance 0.10 0.60 0.07 0.29 0.04 0.13
Services 0.05 0.55 0.02 0.17 0.05 0.28
Other 0.53 0.57 0.45 0.50
Household attributes
no. of child 0-5 years old -0.04 1.57 -0.03 1.08 -0.05 1.09
no. of child. 6-15 years old -0.05 2.67 * -0.07 2.86 * -0.03 0.92
Assets
Type of Region (Rural)
Urban 0.06 0.85 -0.09 1.03 0.18 1.60
Oblasts (Osh)
Ethnicity (Krygyz)
Observations 1539 857 682
Log likelihood -1892.50 -968.00 -892.01
Psuedo R2 0.0897 0.1112 0.0873
LR Chi (d.f) 372.97 (53) 242.29 (51) 170.59 (50)
no. of censored obs. 73 32 41
Omitted groups for dummy variables are in (italics)
* statistically significant at the 5% level
Source: Author’s calculations based on KMPS 1996
33
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to explain the slow adjustment in employment in
the Kyrgyz Republic that took place so much later in the reform process despite
initial large falls in output. Here we explained why this was a rational process of
adjustment given the particular institutional features of the Soviet labour market
that were similar throughout the FSU.
The main contribution of this paper was a model of employer’s adjustment strat-
egy, which illustrated that whilst employers were uncertain of the extent of the eco-
nomic downturn, and enterprises provided enterprise benefits and were in receipt
of State subsidies, it was in the firm’s interest to vary worker intensity (hours of
work) and delay costs (wage payments). As subsidies dried up, and it became too
costly for firms to provide social benefits, employers reduced the quantity (number)
of workers and hence employment fell and unemployment increased. This shift is
a reflection of a change in behaviour towards more competitive behaviour in the
labour market
Intensity of work and delaying of costs were modelled using hours of primary
work and wage arrears, respectively. Empirical evidence found here supports the
predications of the model, namely that while in receipt of subsidies for the provision
of benefits firms varied hours of work but as these subsidies decreased employment
levels changed. The incidence of both these aspects were high in 1993, while by
1996 both wage arrears and the proportion of workers working less than full-time
had fallen significantly. The general bad economic conditions prevalent in 1993 is
reflected in the prevalence across all worker characteristics in the 1993 data. In
1993 all occupations had a relatively high proportion of workers working less than
full-time, and there was little diﬀerence across the enterprise ownership type. An
important consideration in 1993 was the large number of workers, as many as 822,
who reported being employed but had worked zero hours over the reference period,
again an indication of employers maintaining workers on record but allowing for
34
flexibility in intensity of work. Many of these workers were low skilled or farm
workers. In the 1996 data, summary statistics show that agricultural workers fared
worse in terms of working less than full-time work, though the incidence was also
high for the service and the industrial-based sectors. The results of 1996 suggest that
working schedules were more in-line with what we would expect in a competitive
labour market, with higher paid workers working longer hours and the negative
eﬀects of wage arrears and additional employment activities.
Delays in labour market adjustment that has lagged behind falls in output can
be seen to form a rational adjustment process by employers in the light of the
specific institutional features of the Kyrgyz (and other FSU) Republics, namely the
provision of social sector benefits not provided outside the enterprise, enterprise
subsidies based on resource holdings and in particular the availability of additional
finances permitting the firm to operate against soft budget constraints. So although
very slight, there does appear to be some evidence of change in the labour market
between the two periods, with the labour market responding a little more to expected
patterns by 1996. There is evidence to support the hypothesis of a gradual change
in the labour market towards a more profit orientated environment, though there is
a long way to go before a full adjustment can be said to have taken place.
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7 Appendix: Labour Market Trends
Table 5: Growth in real GDP and Unemployment across the Former Soviet Union,
1992-1996
% GDP Unemployment
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Central and eastern Europe and the Baltic States
Bulgaria -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.1 15.3 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.5
Czech Rep. -3.3 0.6 3.2 5.9 4.8 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5
Hungary -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 12.3 12.1 10.4 10.4 10.5
Latvia -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 3.9 8.7 16.7 18.1 19.4
Poland 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 14.3 16.4 16.0 14.9 13.2
Slovak Rep. -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 8.3 14.4 14.8 13.1 12.8
Commonwealth of Independent States
Armenia -52.6 -14.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.5 6.3 5.8 8.4 10.1
Georgia -44.8 -25.4 -11.4 2.4 10.5 5.4 9.1 3.6 3.1 2.8
Kazakhstan -2.9 -9.2 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 0.4 0.6 7.5 11.0 13.0
Kyrgyz Rep. -19.0 -16.0 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 0.1∗ 0.2∗ 3.1 4.4 6.0
Russia -14.5 -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.5 5.3 6.0 7.8 9.0 9.9
Tajikistan -29.0 -11.0 -18.9 -12.5 -4.4 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.6
Ukraine -13.7 -14.2 -23.0 -12.2 -10.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.3
Uzbekistan -11.1 -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 1.6 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Source: Transition Report update 2000, EBRD based on National Statistical Data
∗Transition Report 1998, EBRD based on National Statistical Data
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Table 6: Consumer price inflation (annual averages), 1992-1996
% changes
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Central and eastern Europe and the Baltic States
Bulgaria 82.0 73.0 96.3 62.0 123.0
Czech Rep. 11.1 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8
Hungary 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.6
Latvia 951.0 109.2 35.9 25.0 17.6
Poland 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9
Slovak Rep. 10.1 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8
Commonwealth of Independent States
Armenia 1,346 3,732 5,273 176.7 18.8
Georgia 887.0 3,125 15,607 162.7 39.4
Kazakhstan 1,381 1,662 1,892 176.0 39.1
Kyrgyz Rep. 855.0 722.4 228.7 40.7 31.3
Russia 1,526 875.0 311.4 197.7 47.8
Tajikistan 1,157 2,195 350 609.0 418.0
Ukraine 1,210 4,735 891 377 80.0
Uzbekistan 645.0 534.0 1,568 304.6 54.0
Source: Transition Report update 2000, EBRD based on National Statistical Data
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Variable and Definitions for Tobit Regression
Age: Age of respondent in 1993 or 1996
Education level : Less than High School: Those individuals who had no more
than 9 years of primary and secondary schooling. This category also includes those
with no formal education.
High school only: 10 or more years of primary and secondary schooling and did
not study elsewhere.
Higher Education: Includes those who undertook 10 or more years of primary
and secondary schooling and completed one (or more) of a vocational course or 10
or more years of primary and secondary schooling and completed one (or more) of
university level.
Arrears: Those classified as employed and working over the reference period
but who had not received a wage payment in the last month.
Reduced hours: Those oﬃcially placed on reduced working schedules, where less
than full-time is taken as less than 41 hours a week. This variable tries to capture
those workers who did not voluntarily decide their hours of work.
Ln mthly wage received : Natural log. of the amount of wages received for the
month.
Ln mthly Salary received : Natural log. of monthly salary, in the 1996 data.
Hold Second job: If worker engaged in activities additional to primary employ-
ment in 1993, or held a second job in addition to primary employment in 1996.
Ln Income other labour activities: Natural logarithm of income from additional
activities for 1993 data. Natural logarithm of income from secondary job for 1996
data.
Assets: Electric stove or central gas supply, refrigerator, washing machine, black
and white television, colour television, video cassette recorder, car and motorbike
in 1993, refrigerator, washing machine, black and white television, video cassette
recorder, car in 1996. The assets included are those that are comparable between
the surveys. Additional assets were chosen in 1993 to captures diﬀerences between
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households given the worse conditions experienced in 1993 and hence the extended
list better distinguishes between social groups in 1993.
Type of Region: Urban or Rural.
Oblasts: Naryn, Talass, Djalal-abad, Issuk, Osh, Chui (six oblasts), Bishkek
(capital).
Ethnicity : Kyrgyz, Russian, Other Slavs, Uzbeks, Others.
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